The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow them to match ads to viewers more effectively. In this paper we study the design of optimal mechanisms for a monopolistic data provider to sell information to a buyer, in a model where both parties have (possibly correlated) private signals about a state of the world, and the buyer uses information learned from the seller, along with his own signal, to choose an action (e.g., displaying an ad) whose payoff depends on the state of the world.
INTRODUCTION
A growing trend in online advertisement is the usage of behavioral targeting and user information (like demographics) to better match advertisements to the viewer. This is possible due to the existence of data providing agencies, like Bluekai, Bluecava, eXelate Media, Clearsprings and RapLeaf, whose business consists in collecting, curating and selling information about user intent to advertisers. An article in NYT [Clifford 2009 ] analyzes this phenomenon and points out that data agencies are not exclusively an Internet phenomenon. For example, for many years companies like Acxiom and Experian (founded in 1969 and 1980 respectively) have been collecting information about consumer habits and selling this information to marketers, who then can use it to send catalogs by mail.
A concrete situation is as follows: an advertiser has multiple different ads that he can present to the viewer, and the effectiveness of each of them depends on both the ad and the characteristics of the viewer. For example, a car maker would rather show sport car advertisement to affluent young bachelors while showing ads for family cars to older viewers with kids. A data providing agency (the seller), might have some information about the viewer generating the impression, like gender, age and past interaction on that site. Such information could be valuable to the advertiser as he would be able to use it for better targeting, and the monopolist seller would like to extract as much as possible out of this value as revenue. The advertiser (buyer) might have some information about the viewer as well, and this information might possibly be correlated with the seller's information. The seller has uncertainty about the buyer's information or utilities, yet possesses some belief about those.
While selling information about viewers raises obvious privacy questions, it also raises fascinating questions of a purely economic nature. How does one quantify the value of this information? What is the optimal (i.e. revenue-maximizing) selling strategy for information? What are the qualitative differences between selling information and selling physical goods and services? How do these differences influence the design of markets for information, and the algorithmic problems underlying such markets?
To highlight the issues inherent in such questions, it is helpful to highlight some differences between a seller offering n distinct goods for sale and a seller offering n bits of information.
(1) A seller of goods can group them into bundles, offering a subset of the goods at a specified price. A seller of bits can do many other things: for example, she 1 can set a specified price for revealing the Boolean XOR of the first two bits or some more complex function of the bits.
(2) A consumer of goods generally knows their value even before they are allocated.
The value of a piece of information is typically not known until the information is revealed. (3) By the taxation principle, a buyer of goods can be assumed, without loss of generality, to be facing a posted-price for each bundle (that is independent of his type). A seller of information may, in some cases, be able to extract strictly more revenue using an interactive protocol 2 rather than posted pricing. (See Section 5.)
To be sure, there are some cases in which trading goods possesses some of the characteristics of trading information noted above. For example, a customer in a restaurant does not necessarily know the quality of the food he is about to consume; in turn, this can lead to sellers using interactive protocols, for example, allowing the restaurant customer to try a limited sample of food for a reduced price (or even for free) before deciding whether to order more. We interpret such situations as markets in which information and goods are coupled together, i.e. revealing the quality of the food occurs in conjunction with selling the food itself. This paper addresses some of these questions raised above, by situating them in a model that eliminates extraneous features -such as coupling of goods and information, or competition between multiple buyers and sellers of information -while attempting to remain quite general in the model's assumptions about information and its utility. Our only such assumption is that the utility of information lies in guiding future actions of the party receiving the information. Thus, in our model there is a single seller and single buyer. A state of the world (denoted by ω henceforth) is known to the seller but not the buyer 3 , and the buyer's payoff type (denoted by θ) is known to the buyer but not the seller. The two parties engage in an interactive protocol, consisting of one or more rounds in which signals and/or money are exchanged. After this interaction, the buyer chooses an action (based on his posterior beliefs) and receives a payoff that depends on the state of the world, his own payoff type, and the chosen action.
Crucially, we assume that the seller designs the protocol and can be trusted to faithfully follow the protocol he designs. The buyer, on the other hand, need not be honest: he may send signals that are inconsistent with his true payoff type if it is rational to do so. We do, however, distinguish between committed buyers -who can be committed to complete the specified protocol even if they are sending dishonest signals -and uncommitted buyers, who may abort the protocol if it is rational to do so, for example when they have received information and not yet paid for it.
Our results. The set of all interactive protocols is a large and ill-structured space. Searching for the revenue-maximizing one is unfathomably complex unless there is a way to limit the search space. Our first set of results provide the tools necessary for that. In mechanism design this is often done by invoking some form of the revelation principle [Gibbard 1973; Myerson 1979] . In their setting, buyers have private types and the seller (mechanism designer) needs to choose among a set of outcomes and can charge payments from the buyers. The revelation principle states that if a certain outcome and payments can be implemented in equilibrium of a possibly complicated and interactive mechanism, then it can be implemented in a simple direct revelation mechanism, where buyers report their types, and the mechanism chooses an outcome and payments. Moreover, this mechanism has a simple equilibrium where each buyer reports his type truthfully. If the outcome is the allocation of traditional goods, the revelation principle implies that the mechanism can be implemented as a protocol consisting of three steps: (i) buyers report their type, (ii) payments take place, (iii) outcome is determined. We say that such a mechanism has the one-round revelation property, a property which we define precisely later (in Definition 2.7), but intuitively it means that the buyers move only once (by declaring their type), payments happen only once and the sellers move only once (by choosing the outcome). Now, consider the case where instead of an allocation of traditional goods the outcome is the disclosure of information. Myerson's revelation principle still holds in the sense that any outcome can be implemented by a mechanism where buyers truthfully report their type in the first step. It is not clear, however, if the stronger property of one-round revelation still holds. After the buyer report his type, a sequence of payments and partial information disclosures might be required in order to implement a certain outcome.
Our first set of results (Theorems 3.1 and 4.1) provide conditions under which the one-round revelation property holds. Their precise theorem statement, to be given in Sections 3 and 4, are a bit stronger: they supplement the revelation principle with additional information about the relative timing of signals and payments. Interestingly, the revelation principle fails in the remaining case, when there are uncommitted buyers and correlated signals. The usual logic justifying the revelation principle -that the agents can always report their types to the mechanism and let it simulate their optimal strategy given their type -does not apply for a subtle reason having to do with the timing of payments, the correlation of the signals, and the fact that the buyer is uncommitted. The direct mechanism that attempts to simulate an interactive protocol cannot determine an unbiased estimate of the buyer's expected payment before observing ω, because, unlike in the independent case, the conditional distribution of ω depends on the value of θ (the buyer's true type) and not necessarily on the type that is reported. On the other hand, if the mechanism simulates the protocol using the realization of ω and posts a price that depends on the simulation outcome, this fails because the buyers are uncommitted: the price reveals information about ω, and the buyers may take this information for free while refusing to pay.
Our next results concern algorithms for computing the optimal mechanism. Even when the one-round revelation property holds, it is far from obvious how to compute the optimal mechanism efficiently. In a one-round revelation mechanism, the seller allocates information to the buyer by revealing a (possibly random) signal sampled from a distribution that depends on ω and θ. The main difficulty is that seller is free to choose the support size of this distribution (i.e., the number of potential signals) and in principle, this leads to an optimization problem of unbounded dimensionality. Nevertheless, we show that the optimal mechanism can be computed in polynomial time by solving a convex program of bounded dimensionality; a by-product of the proof is an explicit upper bound on the number of potential signals. In Theorem 4.2, we prove an analogue of the result of Cremer and McLean [1988] on optimal auctions with correlated bids. We show that when the correlation of ω and θ is complex enough that a certain matrix has full rank, the optimal mechanism extracts the full surplus. However, as in [Cremer and McLean 1988] , when this matrix is ill-conditioned the optimal mechanism can be quite exotic, using a mixture of unboundedly large positive and negative payments. This raises the following question: To what extent can its revenue be approximated by simpler and more natural mechanisms? We explore this question in Section 4.2 by investigating the relative power of four progressively more general types of mechanisms:
(i) a "sealed envelope" mechanism that treats ω as an indivisible good by writing its value inside a sealed envelope and posts a price for the the envelope; (ii) mechanisms that reveal a signal about ω but charge the buyer for this signal before revealing it; (iii) mechanisms that reveal a signal about ω and then charge the buyer a nonnegative amount that depends on the signal; (iv) arbitrary mechanisms.
It is not hard to show that if one compares the optimal mechanisms from two of these four classes, their revenue never differs by more a factor of more than |Θ|, the number of potential buyer types. Section 4.2 shows that this multiplicative gap is tight up to a constant factor: for any two of the aforementioned classes of mechanisms, one can find examples where mechanisms in the more general class obtain Ω(|Θ|) times as much revenue as the optimal mechanism in the more specific class.
Our work leaves many interesting open problems, we briefly mentione these problems in Section 6 and discuss them in more detail in the full version of the paper [Babaioff et al. 2012] . We point out potential connections to other areas in computer science (as cryptographic and privacy) and in economics (as cheap talk and dynamic mechanism design).
Related work. The concept of information occupies a notable position in Auction Theory. In the classic work of Milgrom and Weber [1982] , the authors consider different auction formats for a single item and discuss how revenue changes as the seller reveals information (but not directly charging for it) regarding the quality of the good. Persico [2000] remarks that the information structure is almost always assumed to be exogenous and out of the control of the mechanism designer. He initiates a line of inquiry that proposed to endogenize the information acquisition process in the auction.
It is interesting to consider the qualitative changes when information moves from an auxiliary device to the position of the central object being sold. It was noted by many authors that classic results in economics that were designed for dealing with traditional goods fail when selling information. Varian [1999] presents such discussion in a much broader context. Although expressing some similar concerns on the relation with traditional goods, his definition of information is very different from ours.
The sale of information has been considered before in different settings. Admati and Pfleiderer [1986; 1990] study financial advice in the market for securities, Eső and Szentes [2007] develop a model of consulting and Horner and Skrzypacz [2009] study the release of information in settings where contracts are not enforcible. Although those papers share some common insights with our work, their models are mainly orthogonal. In the full version, we discuss in more detail their differences and similarities to our model.
We would also like to point out that our models of information is similar to the model of Athey and Levin [2001] . While the authors derive comparative statics, we take the mechanism design approach. Lastly, our model of uncommitted buyers is in the spirit of participation constraints used in the literature on dynamic mechanism design [Bergemann and Valimaki 2006; Athey and Segal 2007] and is related to the setting of non-enforceable contracts of Horner and Skrzypacz [2009] .
SETTING: CONTEXT AND PROTOCOLS
We consider a setting with a buyer and a monopolist seller. The buyer is a decision maker and his decision can be represented as picking an action a ∈ A. His reward from this action depends on the state of the world which is unobservable. However, both buyer and seller get private signals about the state of the world. Let θ ∈ Θ be the private signal of the buyer and ω ∈ Ω be the private signal of the seller. In this paper we consider the case that both Θ and Ω are finite. The buyer's expected reward for taking action a when the two signals are realized to θ, ω is given by u(θ, ω, a). The pair of private signals comes from a joint distribution μ ∈ Δ(Ω × Θ). 4 We denote the prior on ω by the vector p ∈ R Ω + , i.e., p(ω) = μ(ω). We call the pair (u, μ) the context and assume it is common knowledge.
To illustrate the model, suppose the buyer is an Internet advertiser who has acquired one display-ad slot and is deciding which ad to show to the user. So, the set A represents the possible ads he can place on this slot. The effectiveness of each ad depends on who the user is exactly. This is unknown to the buyer, but he has a private signal θ, which is the user browsing history in the website. Consider now the seller as a data provider who has information about age, gender, geographic location and income range of the user. Let this information be encapsulated in a signal ω.
Another interpretation is to consider θ as the type of the buyer. Since the reward of the buyer u(θ, ω, a) is a function of θ, one can use the same model to express the seller's uncertainty about the buyer's reward function.
The information that the seller holds is valued by the buyer. If the buyer observe his signal θ and nothing more, his expected reward is max a E ω [u(θ, ω, a)|θ] , where the expectation is taken over ω sampled from μ(·|θ). If he also learns the value of ω exactly, his expected reward increases to E ω [max a u(θ, ω, a)|θ]. His surplus from knowing ω is thus:
Ideally, the seller would like to extract this extra surplus as revenue, but as she faces uncertainty regarding the buyer (she does not know θ) and since the buyer act strategically, generically the seller would not be able to extract all that surplus. The central question of this paper is, "What mechanisms can the seller use in order to extract the largest possible fraction of this surplus?"
Sealed Envelope Mechanism
Before we start exploring the space of all possible mechanisms, we present a very simple (and usually suboptimal) mechanism -the Sealed Envelope Mechanism. We do so in order to highlight some basic difficulties in designing mechanisms for selling information. In this mechanism the seller treats the information as if it were a regular good. She writes ω on a piece of paper, puts it inside an envelope and then offers the envelope for a fixed price t to the buyer. If the buyer's type is θ, then his value for the envelope equals to ξ(θ), his surplus from knowing ω, so the revenue is
Note that the seller is not using her knowledge of ω in determining t. It is easy to optimize t to obtain the best Sealed Envelope Mechanism.
Notice that, after seeing ω, the seller can update her belief about θ. The seller might try to change the mechanism in the following way: enclose ω in an envelope and sell it for price t(ω) maximizing t · P θ∼μ [ξ(θ) ≥ t|ω]. By doing so, the seller leaks information in the prices. Upon observing price t(ω), the buyer gains information about ω even without buying the envelope.
Generic Interactive Protocol
Our first step is to define a generic interactive protocol between the buyer and the seller. We assume that the protocol is designed by the seller with only knowledge of the context (u, μ). The protocol prescribes the behavior of the seller for each ω and we assume that the seller always follows this prescription. All of this is known to the buyer.
After this we state Myerson's revelation principle for this setting and then we formally define the stronger notion of one-round revelation. Then we discuss to what extend it is possible to obtain one-round revelation mechanisms for this setting.
DEFINITION 2.1 (GENERIC INTERACTIVE PROTOCOL). A generic interactive protocol for a context (u, μ) is a finite decision tree defined on a set of nodes N . For each non-leaf node, let C(n) be the children of node n. Each non-leaf node is labeled either as a seller-node, as buyer-node or a transfer-node. Furthermore:
-each seller node n has a prescription of the seller behavior, which associates for each ω a probability distribution over C(n). Formally, the prescription on node n is a collection of distributions ψ ω n ∈ Δ(C(n)), one for each ω.
-each transfer node n has only one child and has associated with it a fixed (possibly negative) amount t(n).
In practice we can think of each edge as labeled with a different message. Starting from the root, if the seller or buyer moves, she or he sends a message, which is represented by moving down the tree (picking a child). As the seller pledges to follow the protocol, her behavior (distribution of messages she sends conditional on ω) is encoded in seller nodes in advance. On the other hand, the buyer strategically decides on the messages he sends at buyer nodes given the protocol tree defined by the seller. Moving down the tree from a transfer node n to its child represents a money transfer; the value t(n) designates how much is transferred from buyer to seller, so a negative value represents a payment to the buyer. No action is taken at leaf nodes. In each such a node the buyer will update his belief about ω based on the protocol history. This belief is called the posterior probability distribution. We consider two types of strategies for the buyer: committed and uncommitted strategies. A committed strategy is one where we can trust the buyer to follow the entire protocol, i.e., when reaching a buyer node, he sends one of the messages specified by the protocol and when reaching a transfer node, he sends or receives the specified amount of money. An uncommitted strategy is one where the buyer has, on top of that, the option of defecting from the protocol in each node, by simply leaving the mechanism (which is formally captured by allowing him to play "⊥"). More formally:
DEFINITION 2.2 (BUYER STRATEGIES).
A committed strategy is a collection of distributions φ θ n ∈ Δ(C(n)) for each buyer-node or transfer-node n and each type θ. An uncommitted strategy is a collection of distributions φ θ n ∈ Δ(C(n) ∪ {⊥}) for each buyer-node or transfer-node n and each type θ.
At this point, it is instructive to represent the Sealed Envelope Mechanism in the form of a generic protocol. It is a tree consisting of three interior nodes: in the root there is a buyer-node with two children corresponding to the messages: "Do not accept the offer" and "Accept the offer". The child corresponding to "Do not accept the offer" is a leaf. The other child is a transfer-node with the specified amount of t. Its only child is a seller-node. This seller node has a child for each ω ∈ Ω and the seller prescription for this node is simply ψ ω n (ω) = 1. See Figure 1 for an illustration. Two other natural selling strategies are important in this work. Pricing Mappings refers to any posted-price mechanism in which the seller presents a menu of offers each having the following form: for a fixed amount of money, the buyer obtains the right to observe a random signal sampled by the seller from a distribution that depends on the value of ω in a pre-specified way. Pricing Outcomes refers to a similar type of posted-price mechanism with one crucial difference: rather than charging the buyer a fixed amount of money after he selects an offer from the menu, the amount that the buyer pays (or receives) is allowed to depend on the signal that is revealed by the seller. This gives the seller the potential to price-discriminate among buyers whose different types lead to their having different beliefs about the conditional distribution of ω, and therefore different assessments about the expected cost of accepting a given offer. Mechanisms that price mappings or price outputs can easily be represented in the form of generic interactive protocols, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
It is important to notice that the seller designs the protocol solely based on the context, and after she designs the protocol its description becomes common knowledge. This happens before the pair (θ, ω) is drawn. For example, the price at which the item is offered in the Sealed Envelope Mechanism is hard-coded in the protocol, so there is no need for the seller to send a message announcing it. Now we define the utility associated with a committed strategy for a given protocol. Each committed strategy φ induces a distribution over the leaves of the tree: sample (θ, ω) ∼ μ, then start in the root and use ψ ω n and φ θ n to move down the tree until a leaf is reached. Let Z be the leaf reached. For each leaf associate τ ( ) the sum of the amounts of the transfer-nodes in the path between and the root. We define the utility of buyer of type θ for φ as:
We say that a protocol is voluntary is there is a committed strategy φ such that
This means that the expected utility the buyer gets from participating in the protocol is at least as large as the utility he would get by not participating in it. A committed strategy is called optimal if for all θ and for all alternative committed strategies φ , U (θ, φ) ≥ U (θ, φ ). The revenue extracted by this protocol is:
We can define similar concepts for uncommitted strategies: for a given node n, let τ (n) be the sum of the amounts in the transfer nodes in the path between the root and n (not including n). An uncommitted strategy defines a distribution Z over the nodes of the tree (not necessarily leaves) and we can therefore define Z, U (θ, φ), optimal strategy and revenue in the exact same way. Notice that every protocol is trivially voluntary for uncommitted buyers, since there is always a strategy guaranteeing the buyer max a E ω [u(θ, ω, a) |θ], which is the strategy that defects at any transfer node. DEFINITION 2.3. We say that it is possible to extract revenue R from a committed (uncommitted) buyer in a context (u, μ) if there is a voluntary protocol for this context and an optimal committed (uncommitted) strategy φ for this protocol with revenue at least R.
Notice that in the case of committed buyers 'voluntary' is an important restriction, because otherwise, one could simply have a mechanism consisting solely of a transfer node of amount R and a leaf. For uncommitted buyers, however, the only optimal strategy in such a mechanisms would be to defect in the root. DEFINITION 2.4. We define the optimal revenue that can be extracted from a committed (uncommitted) buyer in a context (u, μ) to be the maximum R such that for any > 0 it is possible to extract revenue R − from a committed (uncommitted) buyer in a context (u, μ).
Revelation Principle and One-Round Revelation Mechanisms
First we define the concept of a revelation mechanism, in the sense of Gibbard [1973] and Myerson [1979] and recast their celebrated revelation principle in our setting (its proof is included, for completeness, in the full version of this paper [Babaioff et al. 2012] ). For our purposes it would be sufficient to formulate it in terms of revenue (traditional formulations are somewhat more general). 
DEFINITION 2.5 (REVELATION MECHANISM
)
INDEPENDENT SIGNALS
In this section we analyze the case when ω and θ are independent, which is simpler than the general case. In this case, the seller's belief about θ and the buyer's belief about ω are common knowledge. First we prove that for this setting, we can focus on One-round Revelation Mechanism when searching for the optimal mechanism. Then we show how to compute it efficiently using a convex program. Finally we show that there always exists a protocol with a fairly small tree. The proof is presented in the full version of the paper. A consequence of Theorem 3.1 is that with independent signals the fact that the buyer is committed does not help the seller to extract more revenue. In this setting it is possible to extract revenue R from uncommitted buyers if and only if it is possible to extract revenue R from committed buyers.
Pricing Mappings Mechanism. Theorem 3.1 allow us to focus on Pricing Mappings Mechanisms. An alternative way of describing a Pricing Mappings Mechanism is as a fixed menu of contracts {(Y
The contract (Y θ , t θ ) is intended for a buyer of type θ (in the sense that it would be optimal for such a buyer to choose that contract out of the menu). A buyer choosing the contract (Y θ , t θ ) would pay t θ and observe one realization of the random variable Y θ that is correlated with ω, taking values in a finite set S θ . We call the elements of S θ signals, since they reveal to the buyer some information about ω. By buying the contract (Y θ , t θ ) a buyer of type θ gets utility
. Now, we discuss how to design the menu of contracts in order to maximize revenue.
To be more precise, Y θ is a random variable that is produced by the seller using ω and possibly some random bits r that are independent of (ω, θ). Without loss of generality we represent Y θ by a family {ψ Without loss of generality, we can call (Y θ , t θ ) the favorite contract of a buyer of type θ. In order for such set of contracts to be valid we need to make sure that: (1) the protocol is voluntary, i.e., the utility of a buyer of type θ by taking contract (Y θ , t θ ) is at least as high as his utility of not participating in the mechanism and acting using his belief given only θ, and (2) contract (Y θ , t θ ) is indeed his favorite one, i.e., he would not strictly prefer to misreport his type and buy a contract (Y θ , t θ ) for some θ = θ.
Property (1) ensures individual rationality (IR) and property (2) ensures incentive compatibility (IC). Formally: DEFINITION 3.2. A menu of contracts {(Y θ , t θ )} θ∈Θ is valid if and only if:
Given a valid menu of contracts, its associated revenue is given by θ∈Θ μ(θ)·t θ . This definition implicitly assumes that whenever the buyer of type θ is indifferent between contract (Y θ , t θ ) and not buying anything, i.e. the IR constraint is tight, then he buys contract (Y θ , t θ ). It also assumes that whenever he is indifferent between (Y θ , t θ ) and (Y θ , t θ ), he buys (Y θ , t θ ). This assumption is without loss of generality, since given any menu of contracts {(Y θ , t θ )} θ∈Θ with revenue R, for every > 0 it is possible to produce a menu {(Y θ , t θ )} θ∈Θ with revenue (1 − ) · R such that all IR and IC inequalities hold strictly. We defer the formal proof of this fact to the full version.
Our goal is, for any given context, to design the valid menu of contracts with largest possible associated revenue. We call it the optimal menu.
Before starting to optimize the menu, consider a couple of definitions: if Y θ is a variable taking values in a space S θ , then for each s ∈ S θ , the Y θ -posterior associated with s is the distribution q ∈ Δ(Ω) such that q(ω) = P(ω|s). We define the value of buyer of type θ for posterior q as:
which is a piecewise-linear convex function v θ : R Ω + → R. Usually v θ (q) is defined for q ∈ Δ(Ω), but sometimes it is used for vectors q ≥ 0 such that ω q(ω) = 1. The reader should note, however that it is a homogeneous function:
We next show that we can represent a signal by a distribution over a finite set of posteriors (Observation 3.4) without repetition (Observation 3.3). The proofs of the observations are immediate, but we include in the full version for completeness. Given that the posteriors associated with each signal s ∈ S θ are different, we can represent Y θ by a distribution over a finite set of posteriors, i.e., a set Q of posteriors, each q ∈ Q being of the form q ∈ Δ(Ω), and a probability x θ (q) of each posterior q ∈ Q. The condition that a distribution over posteriors represents a random variable correlated with ω is in the following observation, whose proof is immediate. 
From this point on, we represent each Y θ as a function x θ : Δ(Ω) → [0, 1] with finite support, satisfying Equation (F ) for each θ.
For any finite set of posteriors Q ⊂ Δ(Ω), we can formulate a restricted revenue maximization problem -for mechanisms that offer a menu of contracts with posteriors restricted to belong to Q -as LP 1 below with variables x θ (q) for each θ ∈ Θ, q ∈ Q and t θ for each θ ∈ Θ. Recall that p ∈ Δ(Ω) is the prior on ω, i.e., p(ω) = μ(ω).
The constraints in LP 1 correspond to the characterization of valid contracts in Definition 3.2 and the feasibility of the representation of contracts as distributions over posteriors in Observation 3.4.
To work with a linear program of finite size, we have restricted q to belong to a finite set Q. It is conceptually easier to think of q as ranging over the entire set Δ(Ω), in which case LP 1 would represent the revenue maximization problem in full generality. The following lemma, whose proof is in the full version, shows that the restriction to a finite set of posteriors is without loss of generality. There is a finite set Q * that can be precomputed from knowledge of the function u alone, such that solving LP 1 with Q = Q * is guaranteed to produce an optimal menu of contracts. By passing to the dual of LP 1 , we get an LP with O(|Θ| 2 ) variables. Below, we give a separation oracle for the dual showing that it can be solved in polynomial time. The variables of the dual are g θ , h θ,θ ∈ R and y θ ∈ R Ω :
Separation oracle: The second family of constraints is of size |Θ|, so separating it is trivial. In order to separate the first family we re-write the constraints in a different way. Notice that the v θ (·) is the maximum over |A| linear functions. So, we can substitute each constraint of the first family for the following |A| constraints:
for all a ∈ A, θ ∈ Θ and q ∈ Q * . Now, for fixed a, θ we want to check if this constraint is satisfied by all q ∈ Q * or find one q for which the constraint is violated. Relaxing the requirement q ∈ Q * to q ∈ Δ(Ω), this is equivalent to solving the following convex programming problem:
LEMMA 3.6. The convex programming problem above can be solved exactly in polynomial time. Given an optimal solution q ∈ Δ(Ω), there must exist another optimal solution q * that belongs to Q * , and we can find such a q * in polynomial time.
The proof (given in the full version) assumes that the set A is finite and polynomially bounded. But even if A has exponential size, if one is able to solve the problem max a E ω∼q u(ω, θ, a) for any posterior q, we can still solve the problem.
Comparison with Sealed Envelope. The sealed envelope mechanism presented in Section 2.1 can extract at least 1/|Θ| revenue of the optimal mechanism, by the following simple observation: if a there is a voluntary protocol that extracts revenue R from a certain context (u, μ), then there is at least one θ for which (θ, ω, a) ] is the maximum surplus that can be extracted from a buyer of type θ. By setting the price of the envelope to t = ξ(θ) − for some tiny > 0, the mechanism guarantees revenue at least μ(θ) · ξ(θ). In the full version we show this bound is tight by presenting a context where the sealed envelope mechanism can not extract more then Ω( 1 |Θ| ) of the optimal mechanism. Protocols with Small Trees. We just showed how to compute the revenue optimal protocol in polynomial time when θ and ω are independent. We know that the protocol has polynomial size, where its size is measured by the number of nodes in the tree representing the protocol. Here, we make it more explicit and show that there is a protocol of size O(|Ω| · |Θ| + |Θ| 2 ). We show that by bounding the sum of the support size of the random variables in the menu of contracts. This bounds the number of leaves of the One-round Revelation Mechanism (Theorem 3.1). As the number of nodes in the tree representing this protocol is at most 3 times the number of leaves (twice the number of leaves plus one node for the buyer and |Θ| seller nodes), the bound on the size of the tree follows from the bound on the number of leaves. The proof of the next theorem is in the full version. The fact that the quadratic lower bound holds even for m = 2 is somewhat counterintuitive: even when the information being sold is a single bit, there are contexts in which revenue maximization requires using signals that consist of Ω(log n) bits.
CORRELATED SIGNALS WITH COMMITTED BUYERS
In Section 3 we have considered independent signals and observed that for that case the seller does not care if the buyer is committed or not. In this section we consider correlated signals and committed buyers, the case of correlated signals and uncommitted buyers will be discussed in Section 5. Throughout this section we assume that the buyer is committed.
Pricing Outcomes Mechanism
In the previous section we showed that if θ, ω are independent, then the optimal protocol had the form of offering a menu of contracts with a fixed price for each contract. In this section we show that this is not sufficient to optimize the revenue whenever θ, ω are correlated. In order to optimize revenue, we need to add a twist: we still offer a menu of options, each option having a random variable Y θ correlated with ω and taking values in S θ . Instead of a fixed price, however, we charge a specific price for each outcome s ∈ S θ of the signaling scheme. We continue to refer to the options on the menu as contracts, although this means that the word contracts has a slightly different meaning in this section than in the preceding one (as it is no longer the case that the buyer pays before observing any signal).
Why does this construction help in designing mechanisms to optimize revenue? Suppose a seller designs a variable Y taking values in S. Consider ψ ω ∈ Δ(S) for each ω such that the seller produces s ∈ S by sampling s according to ψ ω . If ω and θ were independent, the seller would be always choosing the same distribution from the buyer's perspective, which would be P(s) = ω μ(ω)·P(ψ ω = s). However, since θ and ω are correlated, different buyer-types perceive different distributions over S: a buyer of type θ perceives P(s|θ) = ω μ(ω|θ) · P(ψ ω = s). So, if we condition the prices on the outcomes s, two different buyer-types see different prices for the same contract. This increases our power of price-discrimination. For the case of committed buyers we are able to show the existence of an optimal One-Round Revelation Mechanism.
THEOREM 4.1 (EXISTENCE OF A ONE-ROUND OPTIMAL MECHANISM). For any context (u, μ), if it is possible to extract revenue R from a committed buyer in this context, then there is a Pricing Outcomes Mechanism that does so.
It should be noted that the fact that buyers are committed to follow the mechanism until the end is crucial. In fact, in any protocol containing a transfer node in which the buyer needs to pay the seller and whose child is a leaf, the optimal uncommitted strategy would be to defect at that transfer node. In other words, uncommitted buyers could acquire the information and leave without paying. We mention one way to solve this problem: before the mechanism starts, ask a large sum of money from the buyer. Run the mechanism and then gives the large sum of money back to the buyer. This will guarantee that the buyer follows the mechanism until the end, so as not to lose his initial deposit. This will add an extra level to the mechanism: one transfer node in the beginning to charge this large sum of money. The rebate in the end can simply blend with the last transfer.
We defer the proof of Theorem 4.1 to the full version, where we also decribe how to compute the Pricing Outcomes Mechanism achieving optimal revenue in polynomial time using a more sophisticated version of the Convex Program in Section 3.
Full Surplus Extraction. Correlation can be very valuable to the seller. In fact, if the distribution exhibits sufficiently complex correlation, the seller might be able to extract full surplus from the buyers using a Pricing Outcomes Mechanism. Given a context (u, μ) we define the full surplus as the expected gain the buyer would get by learning the value of ω. In other words, the full surplus is E θ [ξ(θ)], where u(θ, ω, a)|θ] . Clearly no mechanism can extract more then the full surplus, and extracting a 1/|Θ| fraction of it is trivial, even using a sealed envelope mechanism, as was observed in Section 3. Now, we show that if μ is sufficiently correlated, then we can extract the full surplus. Our result leverages the ideas developed by Cremer and McLean [1985; 1988] in their work on auctions with correlated bidders, although obviously the setting in which we apply these ideas is different from theirs.
For a joint distribution μ over Ω × Θ we define rank(μ) as the rank of the |Ω| × |Θ| matrix defined by μ(ω, θ). For example, if ω and θ are independent, then rank(μ) = 1. PROOF. We define one single contract in the following way.
Since rank(μ) = |Θ|, this system is guaranteed to have a feasible solution. Now, offer the following contract to all the buyers: the seller reveals the value of ω and requests a payment of t (ω) . By the definition of t, each buyer is indifferent between buying this contract or not buying anything, so the mechanism is voluntary.
Notice that one can offer the above contract with price (1 − ) · t(ω) for each outcome, getting revenue arbitrarily close to the full surplus and making the players strictly prefer to buy the contract.
Continuity and Approximation
One might be tempted to conclude from Theorem 4.2 that for any distribution μ such that |Θ| ≤ |Ω|, one is able to extract full surplus since all matrices [μ(ω, θ)] can be approximated arbitrarily closely by matrices of full rank. The flaw in this argument is obvious. If one sees μ as a Θ × Ω matrix, and ξ ∈ R Θ as a vector with the surplus ξ(θ) in component θ, the payment vector t ∈ R Ω in Theorem 4.2 can be found by solving the linear system μ·t = ξ. If μ is a perturbation of, say, a rank-one matrix (corresponding to θ and ω being independent) then the linear system is very ill-conditioned, and therefore the solution t has a very high norm. This causes t to diverge as μ becomes closer to being independent.
This highlights two problems with the optimal mechanism. The most obvious is that it somehow abuses risk-neutrality. The optimal mechanism produces very large payments which are balanced by large rebates (see the numerical example in the full version). This situation is clearly not desirable in practice. The second problem is that the revenue that can be extracted from a certain context might change abruptly whenever the context changes slightly.
It turns out that these discontinuities in the optimal-revenue function are only unidirectional: as one varies the context, the revenue can abruptly decrease but it cannot abruptly increase. Furthermore, for certain restricted classes of mechanisms, the optimal revenue depends continuously on the context. In particular, this holds for the first three members of the following sequence of progressively more general types of mechanisms. To formalize these continuity assertions, let us fix Ω, Θ, and A, and regard a context (u, μ) as a point in the topological space C = R Θ×Ω×A × Δ(Ω × Θ) equipped with its standard topology. The revenue of the optimal mechanism for committed buyers (or, equivalently, the optimal Pricing Outcomes Mechanism) will be denoted by R (u, μ) . Similarly, we use R e , R c , R p respectively to denote the revenue of the optimal Sealed Envelope Mechanism, Pricing Mappings Mechanism, or Pricing Outcomes Mechanism with No Positive Transfers. The following theorem formalizes the continuity assertions claimed above. Recall that a function f :
The proof is deferred to the full version.
Approximating Revenue. We have seen that the Sealed Envelope Mechanism achieves at least a (1/n)-approximation to the optimal revenue, where n = |Θ|, and that this bound cannot be improved by more than a constant factor in the worst case. The other two classes of mechanisms listed above -Pricing Mappings, and Pricing Outcomes without positive transfers -are substantially simpler and more natural than Pricing Outcomes in full generality, so it would be desirable to approximate the optimal revenue using one of these simpler classes of mechanisms. Unfortunately, in the worst case, the approximation achieved is rather poor: we prove in the full version that there exist contexts (u, μ) 
The proof is an application of Theorem 4.3. We carefully construct a context with independent ω, θ for which the full surplus exceeds R c (u, μ) by a factor of Ω(n). For such a context Pricing Mappings is optimal, i.e. R c (u, μ) = R p (u, μ) = R (u, μ) . Now if we slightly perturb μ to make it into a full-rank matrix, Theorem 4.2 tells us that R(u, μ) jumps up by a factor of Ω(n) to match the full surplus, while Theorem 4.3 ensures that R c (u, μ) and R p (u, μ) can only change by a tiny amount.
In the full version we also show that the worst-case ratio between R c and R p is Ω(n).
CORRELATED SIGNALS WITH UNCOMMITTED BUYERS
In this section we examine mechanisms for uncommitted buyers when signals are correlated, and we formulate an intriguing open question related to a surprising failure of the one-round revelation property. First, we review what is known about uncommitted buyers from previous sections. Theorem 3.1 says that if ω and θ are independent, the revenue-optimal mechanism is aPricing Mappings Mechanism. The optimal strategy for both committed and uncommitted buyers is the same in such a mechanism.
However, when ω and θ are correlated, the revenue-optimal mechanism for committed buyers is a Pricing Outcomes Mechanism (Theorem 4.1). In such a mechanism, the buyer declares his type, the seller sends a signal and the buyer pays a certain amount of money that depends on the signal sent by the seller. Such a mechanism clearly does not work for uncommitted buyers, who can defect after getting the signal but before the payment. In section 4.1, we mentioned one way to get around this problem: before executing the Pricing Outcomes Mechanism the seller can require the buyer to deposit a large amount of money, then the mechanism executes, and after it completes the seller refunds the buyer. This mechanism has clear practical drawbacks: in practice a depositrefund scheme increases the cost of participation as it requires the buyer to always be able to make large payments, even in cases in which at the end of the protocol the net payment is small, or no payments are made in the execution. The latter case is particularly problematic as it is usually costly to establish a payment relationship (e.g. the buyer needs to spend time giving his credit card information) so always imposing payments might deter some buyers.
A protocol has no positive transfers if at any transfer node money always goes from the buyer to the seller, i.e. t(n) ≥ 0 for every transfer node n. Once we exclude positive transfers the problem of designing optimal mechanisms for uncommitted buyers becomes quite challenging. We formulate it as the following open problem: OPEN PROBLEM 5.1. Characterize the protocols that extract maximum revenue from uncommitted buyers subject to no positive transfers. In particular, is it possible to design an algorithm that decides, given any context (u, μ) and target revenue R, whether there exists a protocol with no positive transfers that extracts revenue R from uncommitted buyers?
A natural first attempt to address this problem would be to prove, in the manner of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1, that for this setting one can extract optimal revenue using a One-Round Revelation Mechanism. We show that this approach fails.
THEOREM 5.2 (FAILURE OF THE ONE-ROUND REVELATION PROPERTY).
There exists a context (u, μ) with correlated ω and θ for which some generic protocol with no positive transfers extracts strictly more revenue from uncommitted buyers than any One-round Revelation Mechanism with no positive transfers.
In order to prove this theorem, we observe that if it is possible to extract revenue R from an uncommitted buyer using a One-round Revelation Mechanism, then it is possible to extract the same revenue using a Pricing Mappings Mechanism. This follows easily from the fact that if a transfer node n is the last node before the leaf in a path of the protocol tree, an uncommitted buyer will always defect before this node if t(n) > 0.
Then in Example 5.3 we present a context for which an interactive protocol with no positive transfers extracts strictly more revenue than any Pricing Mappings Mechanism.
Example 5.3. We present a context (u, μ) for which a mechanism where the seller interacts with the buyer twice (producing a protocol tree of height 4) extracts strictly more revenue than any direct revelation mechanism.
Let Ω = {0, 1}, Θ = {0, 1} and the distribution μ = [ 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 ]. Let A = {0, 1} and define the utility such that u(θ, ω, 0) = ω (for a = 0) and u(θ, ω, 1) = 1−9ω (for a = 1). As usual, since Ω = {0, 1} we represent the posterior probability by one real number q ∈ [0, 1], the probability of the event ω = 1. The first part of Figure 2 It is simple to see that the optimal Pricing Mappings Mechanism offers a single contract, pricing the full information (value of ω) at 0.4, and getting revenue of 0.4.
We next present a protocol with no positive transfers that extracts strictly more revenue than the optimal Pricing Mappings Mechanism from uncommitted buyers. The protocol is represented by a tree of height 4 depicted in the second part of Figure  2 . It consists of two transfer nodes with amounts t 1 = 0.533 and t 2 = 0.8. For the seller nodes, the transition probabilities are as follows:
-node s 1 : the seller outputs 1 whenever ω = 0 and outputs 2 whenever ω = 1. -node s 3 : the seller outputs 3 whenever ω = 0 and outputs 4 whenever ω = 1. -node s 2 : the seller moves either to node t 2 or to node 5 according to the following probabilities: P( 5 |ω = 0) = 0, P( 5 |ω = 1) = 5/6 and clearly P(t 2 |ω) = 1 − P( 5 |ω). Now, we claim that the optimal strategy for an uncommitted buyer is to play left (to node t 1 ) whenever θ = 0 and play right (to node s 2 ) whenever θ = 1, and then follow the protocol (make the transfers when asked) without defecting. This claim is proved in the full version. Given these strategies we calculate the expected revenue of the protocol, which is: μ(θ = 0) · 0.533 + μ(θ = 1) · 0.8 · P(t 2 |θ = 1) = 0.4665 > 0.4
We have shown above that generic protocols can extract strictly more revenue than the One-round Revelation Mechanism when buyers are uncommitted and no positive transfers are allowed. One might wonder if such interactive mechanisms can extract as much revenue from uncommitted buyers as can be extracted from committed buyers. We show that the answer is no, as for the setting of Example 5.3 there is a gap between the two. THEOREM 5.4. There exists a context with correlated ω and θ for which the optimal revenue that can be extracted from uncommitted buyers using a protocol with no positive transfers is strictly less than the optimal revenue that can be extracted from committed buyers.
For context (u, μ), the optimal revenue that can be extracted from committed buyers using protocols that has no positive transfers is exactly the revenue R p (u, μ) that can be extracted by Pricing Outcomes with No Positive Transfers Mechanism. To prove the theorem we show in the full version that for the setting of Example 5.3 for some δ > 0 it is impossible to extract revenue of R p (u, μ) − δ from uncommitted buyers using protocols that have no positive transfers.
The intuition behind the proof of Theorem 5.4 is the following: in this context, it is possible to extract the full surplus from committed buyers. In order to extract close to this much revenue from uncommitted buyers, the mechanism must be offering an option that results with some posterior very close to the full information. Now we can show that since a buyer of θ = 1 is paying at most his entire surplus, there is a deviation for a buyer of type θ = 0 that guarantees him almost full information for a price considerably below his surplus.
OPEN PROBLEMS
The design of mechanisms for selling information is an area full of exciting possibilities. In particular, we believe that there might be potential connections with information theory and cryptography. The main concrete open problem left by our paper is the one of designing revenue optimal protocols for uncommitted buyers, when no positive transfers are allowed (Open Problem 5.1). One might also consider extending the model to include multiple buyers purchasing information that is useful when they compete in a second stage (say an auction). Other interesting directions are extending the model to computationally bounded agents (cryptography might prove useful), the dynamic selling of information when the seller and buyer interact repeatedly, and the connections to privacy. Finally, there is the question of identifying interesting sufficient conditions under which simple mechanisms (such as one-round revelation mechanisms in which the seller's behavior is a deterministic function of her private signal ω) are approximately optimal. In the full version of the paper we elaborate on these and other extensions.
